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Abstract
According to the theory of intrinsic value and moral stand-
ing known as the “substance view,” all human beings have
intrinsic value, full moral standing and, with these, a right
to life. The substance view has been defended by numerous
contemporary philosophers who use the theory to argue that
the standard human fetus has a right to life and, ultimately,
that abortion is prima facie seriously wrong. In this paper,
I identify three important errors committed by some of these
philosophers in their defense of the theory—what I refer to as
the “extratheoretical-proposition error,” “quantitative-differences
error,” and “non-normative-answer error”—and conclude that
these errors render their defense inadequate.
Keywords: substance view, intrinsic value, moral standing,
basic capacity, human fetus
1 Introduction
According to the theory of intrinsic value and moral standing known as
the “substance view”—to be referred to here as “SV”—all human be-
ings have intrinsic value, full moral standing and, with these, a right to
life. SV has been defended by numerous contemporary philosophers—
including Robert P. George, Patrick Lee, Christopher Tollefsen, Francis
Beckwith, and Henry Friberg-Fernros—who use the theory to argue that
the standard human fetus has a right to life and, ultimately, that abor-
tion is prima facie seriously wrong.
In this paper, I identify three important errors committed by these
philosophers in their defense of the theory. The first error, what I refer
to as the “extratheoretical-proposition error,” is that of invoking ex-
tratheoretical propositions in an attempt to defend SV’s intratheoretical
propositions. The second error, what I call the “quantitative-differences
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error,” is that of overlooking that quantitative differences in property
possession can give rise to qualitative differences in property posses-
sion which, in turn, can justify treating entities in radically different
ways. The third error, what I refer to as the “non-normative-answer
error,” is that of providing a non-normative answer to a potentially SV-
undermining normative question. Each of these errors will be explained
in much greater detail shortly. But first, a description of SV is in order.
2 On the Substance View
SV is presented here in terms of what I take to be the theory’s funda-
mental axiological and moral propositions (hereafter, simply “fundamen-
tal propositions”)—those propositions that collectively make the theory
what it is and, relatedly, distinguish it from rival theories of intrinsic
value and moral standing. The first proposition pertains to a property
an entity’s possession of which is sufficient for intrinsic value. The second
proposition pertains to the degree to which intrinsically valuable entities
possess moral standing. And the third proposition pertains to the degree
to which it is prima facie wrong—wrong all else being equal, for present
purposes—to kill or let die entities that have full moral standing. SV’s
fundamental propositions are as follows:
(1) All entities possessing the essential property of the basic capacity
for rational moral agency have intrinsic value.
(2) All entities possessing intrinsic value have full moral standing.
(3) It is prima facie seriously wrong to kill or let die any entity that has
full moral standing.
To ensure that these fundamental propositions are properly understood,
a number of clarifying comments about them are in order.
Regarding (1), one should know what is meant by “essential prop-
erty,” “basic capacity,” “rational moral agency,” and “intrinsic value.”
Since these terms—and the concepts invoked by them—are likely to be
familiar to many readers, I’ll be brief. Beginning with the former, an es-
sential property is a property without which it is impossible for the entity
possessing said property to be what it fundamentally is. Essential prop-
erties are to be contrasted with accidental properties, properties without
which it remains possible for the entity possessing said property to be
what it fundamentally is. An essential property of, say, a Smith’s dwarf
chameleon is the capacity to change its skin color—an entity cannot be
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a Smith’s dwarf chameleon while lacking the capacity to change its skin
color. Whereas an accidental property of a Smith’s dwarf chameleon is
to have this or that skin color (green, for instance)—an entity can be a
Smith’s dwarf chameleon even if it is not presently green.
A basic capacity for something (X)—or a basic potentiality for X,
since SV defenders use “capacity” and “potentiality” interchangeably—
is a capacity for X that, due to lack of development, is not remotely, let
alone immediately, exercisable.1 A basic capacity for X is to be distin-
guished from what I call a “proximate capacity” for X—a capacity for
X that is exercisable but, for whatever reason, not immediately so—and
an “ultimate capacity” for X—a capacity for X that is immediately ex-
ercisable.2 To illustrate the differences among these capacities, consider,
for example, the capacity for reasoning. The standard human infant has
the basic capacity for reasoning—a capacity for reasoning that, due to
the infant’s nascent brain development, is not remotely exercisable. The
sleeping adult human being has the proximate capacity for reasoning—a
capacity for reasoning that is exercisable but, due to temporary un-
consciousness, is not immediately so. And the fully conscious standard
adult human being has the ultimate capacity for reasoning—a capacity
for reasoning that is immediately exercisable.
As for rational moral agency, it is the capacity to make, and act on
the basis of, moral judgments. (It’s worth observing that this capacity
cannot be had barely. In order to have it, an entity must possess other ca-
pacities, such as the capacities for consciousness, rationality, concept pos-
session, and so on.) The basic capacity for rational moral agency, then, is
the not-remotely-exercisable capacity for making, and acting on the ba-
sis of, moral judgments. Or, to put it in terms of potentiality (again, SV
defenders use “capacity” and “potentiality” interchangeably), the basic
potentiality for rational moral agency is the not-remotely-actualizable
potential for making, and acting on the basis of, moral judgments.
Finally, for an entity to have intrinsic value is for it to be valuable
in and of itself—valuable, that is, in its own right. Intrinsic value is
perhaps best understood when contrasted with extrinsic, particularly
instrumental, value. For an entity to have instrumental value is for it to
be valuable as a means to something else that is valuable, whatever it
might be. With that in mind, one way to think about intrinsic value is
that entities that have it are valuable even when they are not valuable
as a means to anything else that is valuable.
With this understanding of intrinsic value in mind, one can see that
it is possible for two entities to be intrinsically valuable without being
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equally valuable. That is, it is possible for intrinsic value to admit of
degrees and, in turn, for one intrinsically valuable entity to be more valu-
able than another intrinsically valuable entity. After all, that an entity
is valuable in and of itself tells us nothing about just how valuable it is.
That said, and as will be addressed in greater detail below, SV defenders
hold that intrinsic value is not a degreed property—as Beckwith puts it,
“you either have it or you don’t.”3 Despite the appearance of contra-
diction, however, their position on intrinsic value is coherent. For SV
defenders have a particular kind of intrinsic value in mind, one in virtue
of which an entity is worthy of a high level of concern and respect.4 In a
word, it is a property in virtue of which an entity possesses dignity. SV
defenders can grant, then, that two entities can be intrinsically valuable
without being equally valuable—that is, they can grant that some kinds
of intrinsic value admit of degrees—while, at the same time, maintain
that a particular kind of intrinsic value, in virtue of which an entity pos-
sesses dignity, does not. All this to say, in the present context, for an
entity to have intrinsic value is for it to be valuable in and of itself and
in a dignity-conferring way.
As for (2), in order to understand it, one needs to know what it meant
by “full moral standing.” Beginning with “moral standing” (or “moral
status,” as some prefer to call it), to have it is to be morally considerable.
It is, as Mary Anne Warren puts it,
to be an entity towards which moral agents have, or can have,
moral obligations. If an entity has moral status, then we may
not treat it in just any way we please; we are morally obliged
to give weight in our deliberations to its needs, interests, or
well-being. Furthermore, we are morally obliged to do this
not merely because protecting it may benefit ourselves or
other persons, but because its needs have moral importance
in their own right.5
And to have “full” moral standing—or full moral “respect” or “worth,”
as some SV defenders prefer—is to have the greatest degree of moral
standing an entity can possess (earthly entities, at any rate) which, in
turn, entails that moral agents have the greatest degree of moral obliga-
tion to those entities that have it. Moreover, with full moral standing
comes a right to life—briefly, a right not to be killed or allowed to die
unjustly—or so SV defenders hold.6 (That they hold that a right to life
involves the latter—a right not to be allowed to die unjustly—will be
addressed shortly.) According to (2), then, entities that are intrinsically
valuable have full moral standing and, with it, a right to life.
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With respect to (3), and related to (2), the wrongness—the degree
thereof, in particular—of killing or letting die an entity that has full
moral standing is a function of the latter. More specifically, the degree
of wrongness supervenes on the entity’s degree of moral standing (and
ultimately—as (1) and (2) indicate—on the entity’s basic capacity for
rational moral agency). Accordingly, for any two entities possessing full
moral standing, it is just as prima facie seriously wrong to kill the one
as it is to kill the other, and it is just as prima facie seriously wrong to
let the one die as it is to let the other die. It is worth noting here that
this is consistent with a position typically embraced by SV defenders:
that killing is prima facie morally worse than letting die. After all, both
killing and letting die can be prima facie seriously wrong even if the
former is more so than the latter.
It behooves me to note here that there is an alternate understanding
of full moral standing and, with it, the degree of wrongness of killing
or letting die entities that possess full moral standing available to SV
defenders (my thanks to an anonymous referee for suggesting this). Some
SV defenders might understand these things in the following way: though
full moral standing does not allow one to differentiate morally between
such entities with respect to their negative rights (briefly, their rights
against being treated in certain ways, such as their right not to be killed
unjustly), it does allow one to differentiate morally between the entities
with respect to their positive rights (their rights to be treated in certain
ways, as a right to be saved would be). More specifically, some SV
defenders allegedly maintain that full moral standing provides entities
that have it the negative right not to be killed unjustly and does so in
such a way that one may not differentiate morally between two entities
possessing this negative right (it is just as prima facie seriously wrong to
kill the one as it is to kill the other), but that full moral standing does
not provide entities that have it with the positive right to be saved, let
alone provide it in such a way that one may not differentiate morally
between two entities possessing this positive right. Consequently, one
might think that there is room for differentiation with respect to how to
defend the positive rights of entities that have full moral standing.
Though much could be said about this other understanding of full
moral standing and, with it, the degree of wrongness of killing or letting
die entities that possess full moral standing, for the sake of space, I must
limit my comments on it to the following. To begin with, and as alluded
to above, the right to be saved should not be confused with the right not
to be allowed to die unjustly. The latter is a negative right while the
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former is a positive right, the latter intrinsically regards an unjust death
while the former does not, and so on. What’s more, since SV defenders
hold that one is not allowed to differentiate morally between entities
that have full moral standing with respect to their negative rights, it
follows that one is not allowed to differentiate morally between entities
that have the negative right not to be allowed to die unjustly. (That
entities with full moral standing have such a negative right, given SV,
will be addressed shortly.) Hence my construal of SV as entailing that,
for any two entities possessing full moral standing, it is just as prima
facie seriously wrong to kill the one as it is to kill the other, and it is
just as prima facie seriously wrong to let the one die as it is to let the
other die. In sum, though moral differentiation when it comes to positive
rights might be consistent with SV, the right under consideration here—
the right not to be allowed to die unjustly—is a negative right and, as
such, one that does not allow for moral differentiation, given SV.
But is it true that, according to SV, entities with full moral standing
possess the negative right not to be allowed to die unjustly? After all,
SV defenders usually only explicitly hold that such entities have the
negative right not to be killed unjustly. But a convincing case can be
made that they implicitly hold that entities with full moral standing
also possess the negative right not to be allowed to die unjustly. Simply
put, the grounds they provide for holding that entities with full moral
standing have the right not to be killed unjustly serve equally as grounds
for holding that entities with full moral standing have the right not to be
allowed to die unjustly. To wit, while presenting their account of what
suffices for humans to have full moral standing and, with it, dignity and
rights—especially a right to life—George and Tollefsen write that
[b]y identifying a type of action as one that always involves
damage or destruction to a basic good [e.g., life], we can
identify an action type as being always incompatible with a
will to integral human fulfillment. And if this type of action
would therefore be always and everywhere wrong for anyone,
then we can speak of a corresponding absolute and inviolable
right.7
They then identify an action type of this sort—namely, “any choice to
deliberately damage or destroy” a human, which constitutes “a viola-
tion of an inviolable right, the human right to life”—and conclude that
humans with full moral standing have a right not to be killed unjustly.8
As one can see, these claims provide equal support for the conclusion
that humans with full moral standing have a right not to be allowed
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to die unjustly. For “any” choice to deliberately damage or destroy a
human includes the choice to deliberately destroy a human by allowing
her to die (e.g., by deliberately starving her to death). Given their own
grounds for holding that entities with full moral standing have dignity
and rights, particularly the right to life, then, George and Tollefsen have
reason to conclude, not only that such entities have a right not to be
killed unjustly, but that such entities have a right not to be allowed to
die unjustly as well.
Much more could be said about this alternate understanding of full
moral standing and, with it, the degree of wrongness of killing or letting
die entities that possess full moral standing that might be available to
SV defenders (e.g., should we agree with such SV defenders that full
moral standing allows one to differentiate morally between the entities
with respect to their positive rights?). But this will have to do for now.
With these clarifying remarks about SV’s fundamental propositions
out of the way, three questions naturally arise. First, which entities do
SV defenders believe possess the essential property of the basic capacity
for rational moral agency? As noted above, all human beings, including
but not limited to:
(a) the standard adult human being,
(b) the reversibly comatose adult human being,
(c) the suicidal adult human being,
(d) the standard human infant, and
(e) the standard human fetus (by which is meant a developing human
organism from conception until birth).
In turn, they hold that each of these entities possesses intrinsic value and
full moral standing, and that it is prima facie seriously wrong to kill any
one of them or let any one of them die. (It is important to note that SV
defenders do not believe that any of the nonhuman animals of which we
are aware—even those that are rather intelligent, such as dolphins and
ravens—possess the essential property of the basic capacity for rational
moral agency and, with it, intrinsic value and full moral standing.)
Second, and related to the previous point regarding nonhuman an-
imals, given that the full moral standing of (a)–(e) (among others) is
a function of their basic capacity for rational moral agency, why is the
theory called the “substance view”? Briefly, SV defenders hold that the
basic capacity for rational moral agency is an essential property of a
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particular substance sort—the human organism—and that (a)–(e) are
essentially human organisms. That said, SV defenders contend that
(a)–(e) have the intrinsic value and moral standing they do, not merely
because they are members of the species Homo sapiens, but because of
the human organism’s essential property of the basic capacity for ra-
tional moral agency. To state the point counterfactually, if the human
organism did not possess the essential property of the basic capacity for
rational moral agency, then (a)–(e) would not possess the intrinsic value
and moral standing that they do.9
Finally, on what grounds do SV defenders embrace SV? Their pri-
mary argument for it is that of an inference to the best explanation.
As do many moral philosophers arguing over theories of intrinsic value
and moral standing—hereafter, simply “theories” (and its correlative,
“theory”)—SV defenders begin by assuming that (a)–(d) have intrinsic
value and, in turn, full moral standing. They then defend the claim in-
troduced above that the intrinsic value and, with it, full moral standing
of (a)–(d) must be a function of essential rather than accidental prop-
erties. Simply put, if the value and moral standing of (a)–(d) were a
function of accidental properties, then—contrary to SV defenders’ initial
assumption—(a)–(d) would not possess the same value and moral stand-
ing. For, unlike essential properties, accidental properties admit of de-
grees, and (a)–(d) do not possess their accidental properties to the same
degree. Indeed, they don’t even possess all the same accidental proper-
ties. But (a)–(d) do possess the same value and moral standing—they
all have dignity-conferring intrinsic value (again, the dignity-conferring
kind) and full moral standing, or so SV defenders assume. Thus, intrinsic
value and, with it, full moral standing cannot be a function of accidental
properties but must, instead, be a function of essential properties.10
Next, they argue that a particular essential property—the basic ca-
pacity for rational moral agency—best accounts for the intrinsic value
and full moral standing of (a)–(d). That is, they argue that SV is the
best explanation of (a)–(d)’s intrinsic value and full moral standing. Of
course, before one could agree that SV is, in fact, the best explanation
of (a)–(d)’s intrinsic value and full moral standing, one would need to
give alternate theories due consideration. Alas, such is beyond the scope
of this paper. Suffice it to say that, as SV defenders see it, no other the-
ory better explains the intrinsic value and full moral standing possessed
(ex hypothesi) by (a)–(d).11 And since SV defenders believe that (e)
possesses the essential property of the basic capacity for rational moral
agency as well, they infer that (e) also has intrinsic value and full moral
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standing, and that it is prima facie seriously wrong to kill (e) or let (e)
die. Hence Beckwith’s claim regarding the standard human fetus that
“one cannot deprive the standard unborn entity of her life without the
sort of justification we would expect if we were depriving a standard 10-
year-old of his rights.”12 (Beckwith’s use of “deprive” is noteworthy, for
one way one can deprive a human organism of her life is by deliberately
allowing her to die.)
With this description of SV in mind, let us now turn to the epony-
mous errors.
3 The Extratheoretical-Proposition Error
I begin with the extratheoretical-proposition error, the comprehension of
which requires an understanding of the difference between, as well as the
import of, what I refer to as “intratheoretical” and “extratheoretical”
propositions.
By a theory’s intratheoretical propositions, I mean the theory’s fun-
damental propositions—again, those axiological and moral propositions
that collectively make the theory what it is—as well as the axiological
and moral propositions that are deducible from them, either directly or
after the latter are conjoined with at least one nonaxiological/nonmoral
proposition. A theory’s intratheoretical propositions are distinct from
its (read: what are to it) extratheoretical propositions, axiological and
moral propositions that are not among the theory’s fundamental propo-
sitions or deducible from them. With this understanding of the difference
between intratheoretical and extratheoretical propositions in mind, a few
cursory observations about them should be noted immediately.
First, intratheoretical and extratheoretical propositions are theory-
relative: what is an extratheoretical proposition to one theory can be an
intratheoretical proposition to another and vice versa. Second, theories
and their extratheoretical propositions need not be logically incompat-
ible. Despite the fact that a given extratheoretical proposition is not
deducible from a given theory, the former can still be logically compat-
ible with the latter. However (and this is the final observation), that
a given extratheoretical proposition is logically compatible with a given
theory does not change the fact that the former is just that—an ex-
tratheoretical proposition—and, as such, not one of said theory’s funda-
mental propositions or deducible from them. (This final observation is
especially important to understanding the extratheoretical-proposition
error, as will be made clear shortly.)
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Having addressed the difference between intratheoretical and ex-
tratheoretical propositions, let us now discuss their import. Beginning
with intratheoretical propositions, they are essential to assessing a the-
ory’s intrinsic plausibility—that is, to determining the plausibility of a
theory in and of itself. For whether a theory is intrinsically plausible
is a function of its fundamental propositions and the axiological and
moral propositions that are deducible from them—in other words, it’s a
function of the theory’s intratheoretical propositions. This is due to the
fact that a theory’s intratheoretical propositions are intrinsic to—or, as it
might be better put, contained within (fundamentally or deducibly)—the
theory itself. As such, they constitute the set of propositions determi-
native of the theory’s intrinsic plausibility. Accordingly, when it comes
to assessing the intrinsic plausibility of a theory, one way—indeed, the
standard way—is to determine the plausibility of the theory’s intrathe-
oretical propositions.13 If one or more of the theory’s intratheoretical
propositions are not plausible, then, to that extent, the theory is intrin-
sically implausible.
To be sure, the intrinsic plausibility of a theory is a function of other
things as well. To take just one example, it’s also a function of logical
coherence: if a theory’s fundamental propositions are logically contradic-
tory, for instance, then the theory is intrinsically implausible. But one
of the things of which a theory’s intrinsic plausibility is not a function—
and here is where the significance of the final observation made above
arises—is its extratheoretical propositions. Why this is the case might be
obvious: unlike a theory’s intratheoretical propositions—which are con-
tained within (fundamentally or deducibly) the theory itself—a theory’s
extratheoretical propositions are not so contained. They are, instead,
extrinsic to the theory. By their very nature, then, extratheoretical
propositions fall outside the set of propositions determinative of a the-
ory’s intrinsic plausibility.
To flesh all of this out a bit more, take, for example, a theory of
Don Marquis’s which we’ll call the “future-like-ours (or future-of-value)
view.” This theory’s fundamental propositions are as follows:
(i) All entities possessing a future like ours have a right to life.
(ii) It is prima facie seriously wrong to kill any entity that has a right
to life.
Since (i) and (ii) are the future-like-ours view’s fundamental proposi-
tions, they are thereby intratheoretical propositions. But so are (iii) and
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(iv) below, as each is deducible from the theory’s fundamental proposi-
tions:
(iii) It is prima facie seriously wrong to kill entities possessing a future
like ours.
(iv) It is prima facie seriously wrong to kill the standard human infant.
(The first of these additional intratheoretical propositions can be de-
duced directly from the theory’s fundamental propositions. The second
can be deduced after the theory’s fundamental propositions are conjoined
with the nonaxiological/nonmoral proposition “The standard human in-
fant possesses a future like ours.”)14 And the standard way of assessing
the intrinsic plausibility of this theory has been to determine the plau-
sibility of the theory’s intratheoretical propositions—more specifically,
to determine whether some of the theory’s intratheoretical propositions
are implausible. For example, one critique of the future-like-ours view
proceeds as follows:
(i) Given the future-like-ours view, one may deduce that the standard
ovum has a future like ours—and, with it, a right to life—and, thus,
it is prima facie seriously wrong to kill the standard ovum.
(ii) But that it is prima facie seriously wrong to kill the standard ovum
is counterintuitive if not absurd.
(iii) Therefore, the future-like-ours view is intrinsically implausible.15
(Lest there be any confusion, the preceding is simply an illustration of
this way of assessing the intrinsic plausibility of a theory; it is not an
endorsement of this particular critique.) Critiquing Marquis’s theory in
this way amounts to arguing that one of its (alleged) intratheoretical
propositions is counterintuitive and, thus, the theory is, to that extent,
intrinsically implausible.
And so it goes with assessments of the intrinsic plausibility of every
other theory, ostensibly. Take, for instance, four other theories (generally
construed), examined by Warren in her Moral Status: Obligations to
Persons and Other Living Things:
• The life only view: the view that all and only biologically alive en-
tities have full moral standing and, thus, it is prima facie seriously
wrong to kill them.
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• The sentience only view: the view that all and only sentient entities
have full moral standing and, thus, it is prima facie seriously wrong
to kill them.
• The personhood only view: the view that all and only persons have
full moral standing and, thus, it is prima facie seriously wrong to
kill them.
• The relationships only view: the view that all and only entities in
morally relevant relationships have full moral standing and, thus,
it is prima facie seriously wrong to kill them.16
The intrinsic plausibility of each of these theories has been assessed in
this way. A common critique of the life only view, for instance, proceeds
as follows:
(i) Given the life only view, one may deduce that germs have full moral
standing and, thus, it is prima facie seriously wrong to kill germs.
(ii) But that it is prima facie seriously wrong to kill germs is counter-
intuitive if not absurd.
(iii) Therefore, the life only view is intrinsically implausible.
A common critique of the personhood only view proceeds similarly:
(i) Given the personhood only view, one may deduce that two-week
old human infants lack full moral standing and, thus, it is not prima
facie seriously wrong to kill two-week old human infants.
(ii) But that it is not prima facie seriously wrong to kill two-week old
human infants is counterintuitive if not absurd.
(iii) Therefore, the personhood only view is intrinsically implausible.
And so on. (As with the preceding critique of Marquis’s theory, these
are mere illustrations—not endorsements—of these particular critiques.)
Critiquing these theories amounts to arguing that one or more of their
(alleged) intratheoretical propositions is counterintuitive and, thus, these
theories are, to that extent, intrinsically implausible.
Indeed (and at the risk of triggering a Shakespearean “he doth protest
too much” response), SV defenders themselves assess the intrinsic plau-
sibility of theories in this way, at least those that stand in competition
with their own. To take just one example, George and Tollefsen argue for
the intrinsic implausibility of what they call the “developmental view”
as follows:
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(i) Given the developmental view, one may deduce that six-week old
human infants lack full moral standing and, thus, it is not prima
facie seriously wrong to kill six-week old human infants.
(ii) But that it is not prima facie seriously wrong to kill six-week old
human infants is counterintuitive if not absurd.
(iii) Therefore, the developmental view is intrinsically implausible.17
Critiquing the developmental view in this way amounts to arguing that
one of its (alleged) intratheoretical propositions is counterintuitive and,
thus, the theory is, in that respect, intrinsically implausible.
Having covered this way of assessing—specifically, critiquing—the
intrinsic plausibility of theories, let us now address the way in which a
theory so critiqued is to be defended. Because the critique—the coun-
terintuition, in particular—is directed at one or more of the theory’s
intratheoretical propositions, the defender of the theory must do one of
two things to rebut it: either demonstrate that the alleged intratheo-
retical proposition is not an intratheoretical proposition, or grant that
it is but motivate the judgment that it is not counterintuitive much
less absurd. Anything short of this skirts the issue and thereby renders
the defense insufficient. This is usually well understood by defenders of
theories so critiqued, incidentally. Hence, for instance, Marquis’s reply
to the aforementioned critique in which he argues that the alleged in-
tratheoretical proposition—that it is prima facie seriously wrong to kill
the standard ovum—is not, in fact, one of his theory’s intratheoretical
propositions, and Michael Tooley’s reply to critiques of the personhood
only view in which he motivates the judgment that the alleged intrathe-
oretical proposition—that it is not prima facie seriously wrong to kill
two-week old human infants—is not counterintuitive much less absurd.18
But sometimes this is not so well understood. And if, when it’s not,
the defenders of theories so critiqued do neither of these things—that is,
if they neither demonstrate that the alleged intratheoretical proposition
is not an intratheoretical proposition, nor grant that it is but motivate
the judgment that it is not counterintuitive much less absurd—then their
defense sidesteps what’s at issue and thereby fails. So, for instance, if
Marquis had merely invoked what he took to be a theory-saving ex-
tratheoretical proposition—such as, say, “It is not as wrong to kill enti-
ties that don’t have strong time-relative interests in continued existence
(such as ova) as it is to kill entities that do have strong time-relative
interests in continued existence (such as conscious human fetuses)”—
then his defense against such a critique would have skirted the issue
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and, in turn, been inadequate. In short, he would have committed the
extratheoretical-proposition error.
To be sure, had Marquis invoked this extratheoretical proposition,
he would have gotten something arguably right—namely, that it is not
as wrong to kill ova as it is to kill conscious human fetuses. But the
issue here isn’t whether Marquis can invoke some moral proposition or
other in virtue of which he can get this right; it’s whether Marquis’s
theory itself —the future-like-ours view—can get it right. More to the
point, the issue here is whether the future-like-ours view contains within
it, fundamentally or deducibly, any counterintuitive moral propositions.
According to the critique at hand, it does. And whatever else they may
be able to do, extratheoretical propositions cannot extract or otherwise
jettison counterintuitive intratheoretical propositions from the theory
within which they are contained.
With the distinction between and import of intratheoretical and ex-
tratheoretical propositions in mind—as well as the aforementioned ways
of assessing and, in turn, defending a theory’s intrinsic plausibility—let
us turn to one of SV’s intratheoretical propositions, namely:
(4) It is just as prima facie seriously wrong to let a standard human
fetus die as it is to let a standard adult human being die.
This is one of SV’s intratheoretical propositions, as it is deducible from
the conjunction of (1), (2), (3), and the SV-defender-approved nonaxio-
logical/nonmoral proposition “Both the standard human fetus and the
standard adult human being possess the essential property of the basic
capacity for rational moral agency.”19
Now, some philosophers (including this one) argue that SV is intrin-
sically implausible on the grounds that (4) is counterintuitive if not ab-
surd.20 And because this objection—specifically, the counterintuition—
is directed at one of SV’s intratheoretical proposition and, with it, SV’s
intrinsic plausibility, SV defenders must either demonstrate that the al-
leged intratheoretical proposition, (4), is not actually an intratheoretical
proposition, or grant that it is but motivate the judgment that it is not
counterintuitive much less absurd. If they do neither of these things,
then their defense of SV against the critique sidesteps the issue and,
thus, fails.
This is where the extratheoretical-proposition error comes in. For
various SV defenders do just that—neither of these things—opting in-
stead to invoke what they take to be SV-saving extratheoretical proposi-
tions. But extratheoretical propositions are beside the point when what
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is at issue is the plausibility of one of SV’s intratheoretical propositions
and, with it, SV’s intrinsic plausibility.
Here’s an example (for a second from another SV defender, see the
following endnote).21 In their book Embryo: A Defense of Human
Life, SV defenders George and Tollefsen consider a case involving some-
one called “Jones” and his opportunity to save either a five-year-old
girl or ten frozen human embryos from a burning building. In another
critique of SV, I argue that, relying solely upon SV’s intratheoretical
propositions—especially those such as (4)—at best, Jones’s decision to
save either the five-year-old girl or the ten frozen human embryos ought
to be based on an independent procedure and, at worst, Jones ought to
save the ten frozen human embryos rather than the five-year-old girl.22
But that either of these things is the case is, I submit, counterintuitive
if not absurd.
Ostensibly in anticipation of such an objection, George and Tollefsen
offer what they deem to be a SV-consistent way of choosing to save
the five-year-old girl rather than the ten human embryos that does not
depend upon an independent procedure. Specifically, they note that
there are “differences between the embryos and the five-year-old girl
that are or can be morally relevant to the decision concerning whom
to rescue. For example, the five-year-old will suffer great terror and
pain in the fire, but the embryos will not.”23 As George and Tollefsen
see it, then, it’s not the case that Jones’s decision to save either the
five-year-old girl or the ten human embryos ought to be based on an
independent procedure. Rather, it may be based on a moral proposition,
something along the lines of “It is not as prima facie wrong to let entities
lacking sentience die as it is to let entities possessing sentience die.” But
this is not one of SV’s intratheoretical propositions, for it is not one of
SV’s fundamental propositions or deducible from them. Rather, it is an
extratheoretical proposition. Accordingly, in this instance, George and
Tollefsen’s defense of their theory involves merely invoking what is to SV
an extratheoretical propositions. Thus, it sidesteps—and thereby fails to
address—the aforementioned objection to SV’s intrinsic plausibility, an
objection (it bears repeating) that pertains to the counterintuitiveness of
one of SV’s intratheoretical propositions. It is, therefore, inadequate.24
Granted, George and Tollefsen have gotten something arguably
right—namely, that it is not as wrong to let the embryos die as it is
to let the five-year-old girl die. But, as with the Marquis example
above, the issue here isn’t whether George and Tollefsen can invoke some
moral proposition or other in virtue of which they can get this right; it’s
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whether George and Tollefsen’s theory itself—SV—can get it right. More
precisely, the issue here is whether SV contains within it, fundamentally
or deducibly, any counterintuitive moral propositions. According to my
critique, it does. And, again, whatever else they may be able to do,
extratheoretical propositions cannot extract or otherwise discard coun-
terintuitive intratheoretical propositions from the theory within which
they are contained.
One possible reply to this charge of error is that, in deeming (4) coun-
terintuitive if not absurd, I am relying upon an undisclosed extratheo-
retical proposition of one sort or another. In doing so, I am committing
the same error that I accuse SV defenders of committing, namely, that
of invoking an extratheoretical proposition as a way of assessing SV’s
intrinsic plausibility. But this reply misses the mark. To begin with,
the error SV defenders commit is that of attempting to defend SV’s in-
tratheoretical propositions and, with them, intrinsic plausibility by way
of, what are to SV, extratheoretical propositions. In order to commit
such an error, I would need to be attempting to defend some other the-
ory’s intratheoretical propositions and, with them, intrinsic plausibility
by way of what are to said theory extratheoretical propositions. But I
am not attempting to defend the intratheoretical propositions and in-
trinsic plausibility of some other theory, much less doing so by way of
what are to it extratheoretical propositions.
Second, and more to the point, like SV defenders (and most other
defenders of theories), I hold that an intrinsically plausible theory is
one that, among other things, possesses plausible intratheoretical propo-
sitions. To the extent that a theory lacks plausible intratheoretical
propositions—such as when a theory possesses counterintuitive if not
absurd intratheoretical propositions—to that extent the theory is intrin-
sically implausible. Accordingly, regardless of whether my deeming (4)
counterintuitive depends on some extratheoretical proposition—either to
SV or to some other theory—my point is that SV possesses counterintu-
itive intratheoretical propositions and, thus, is intrinsically implausible.
I’ll conclude this section with another possible reply to this charge
of error, which is that SV defenders could take what is to SV an ex-
tratheoretical proposition (but to some other theory an intratheoretical
proposition), make it one of SV’s fundamental and, thus, intratheoret-
ical propositions, and thereby accommodate (attempt to, at any rate)
my strong counterintuitive response to SV. For example, SV defenders
could take, say, the sentience only view’s intratheoretical proposition “It
is not as prima facie wrong to let entities lacking sentience die as it is to
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let entities possessing sentience die,” make it one of SV’s fundamental
propositions, and thereby attempt to accommodate my strong counter-
intuitive response to SV. But there are at least two problems with this
possible reply.
First, and most obviously, doing so would amount to conceding that
they have indeed committed the error which I have charged them of
committing, namely, the extratheoretical-proposition error.
Second, and more importantly, doing so would involve replacing SV
with a new—even if similar—theory of intrinsic value and moral stand-
ing. To wit, were SV defenders to incorporate one of the sentience
only view’s intratheoretical propositions, as per the example above, they
would be replacing SV with another theory, one that might be called the
“substance and sentience view,” the “sentience and substance view,” or
perhaps even simply the “sentience view.” In and of itself, such a move
might not be problematic; indeed, it might be a move in the right theo-
retical direction. But SV, as construed by its defenders, would have to
be discarded in order to make it.
4 The Quantitative-Differences Error
The second error pertains to SV defenders’ claim that mere quantitative
differences in property possession between entities do not justify treating
them in radically different ways. The broader context of this claim is
that of SV defenders’ argument (addressed above) for the claim that the
intrinsic value and full moral standing of (a)–(e) must be a function of
essential, rather than accidental, and thereby degreed, properties. As
George and Tollefsen put it,
[T]he difference between a being that deserves full moral re-
spect and a being that does not (and can therefore legiti-
mately be disposed of as a means of benefiting others) cannot
consist only in the fact that, while both have some feature,
one has more of it than the other. In other words, a mere
quantitative difference (having more or less of the same fea-
ture, such as the development of a basic natural capacity)
cannot by itself be a justificatory basis for treating different
entities in radically different ways.25
George and Tollefsen attempt to bolster these claims by way of the fol-
lowing analogy which, they contend, illustrates the type of error com-
mitted by some of their theoretical rivals:
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A racist picks out shade of skin as a more important char-
acteristic than common humanity in deciding the worth of
human beings. Now, between human beings and all other
nonhuman animals, there is a radical difference in kind; hu-
man beings, unlike every other animal species, have the ba-
sic natural capacity for reason and freedom. But between
any two human beings, the difference in color will always be
only a difference of degree, a difference that makes no dif-
ference to the sorts of being that each is. The racist is thus
behaving radically unfairly toward those he regards as infe-
rior by picking out a characteristic that should be irrelevant
to moral respect. We hold that prejudice and discrimination
against human beings at early developmental stages commits
a species of the same error . . . 26
Before moving on, it is important to note that these claims arise
while George and Tollefsen are arguing against a specific rival theory,
namely, the aforementioned developmental view. In other words, they
arise while George and Tollefsen are arguing indirectly for SV. Accord-
ingly, it should not be assumed in this context that SV has already
been established or otherwise sufficiently defended; to do that, of course,
would be to beg the question against defenders of the developmental
view. Relatedly, George and Tollefsen’s intended conclusion—that mere
quantitative differences in property possession between entities do not
justify treating them in radically different ways—should not be taken
for granted. With that said, let us consider the quantitative-differences
error.
Given that my name for the error comes from the second sentence of
the first blocked quotation above, that sentence will serve as our starting
point. By focusing on the (alleged) moral impotence of mere quantitative
differences in property possession between entities, George and Tollefsen
overlook two important and related facts. First, quantitative differences
in property possession can give rise to qualitative differences in prop-
erty possession. Second, qualitative differences in property possession
that arise from quantitative differences in property possession can jus-
tify treating entities in radically different ways. By overlooking these
facts, George and Tollefsen commit what I am calling the quantitative-
differences error.
To flesh this out a little more, consider, for example, two entities, one
of whom—a standard human infant—has the basic capacity for ratio-
nal moral agency, the other of whom—a standard adult human being—
Rob Lovering: Three Errors in the Substance View’s Defense 19
has the ultimate capacity for rational moral agency. Using George and
Tollefsen’s language, though the standard human infant and the stan-
dard adult human being have the same feature—the capacity for rational
moral agency—the latter has more of it than the former. In other words,
the standard adult human being’s capacity for rational moral agency is
more developed than the standard human infant’s capacity for rational
moral agency, a fact represented, of course, by the terms “basic” and
“ultimate.” (For present purposes, we may ignore considerations of the
proximate capacity for rational moral agency.) Moreover, the quanti-
tative difference between their respective capacities for rational moral
agency gives rise to a qualitative difference. For instance, the standard
adult human being’s capacity for rational moral agency is immediately
exercisable, while the standard human infant’s is not. Accordingly, un-
like the standard human infant, who is only potentially able to make, and
act on the basis of, moral judgments, the standard adult human being is
actually able to make, and act on the basis of, moral judgments. And this
qualitative difference justifies treating the standard adult human being
in ways radically different from those in which we treat the standard hu-
man infant. To wit, it justifies holding the standard adult human being
accountable for her behavior toward other standard adult human beings
(among others); being appreciative of and, when appropriate, rewarding
her—perhaps even with an award a` la the Aurora Prize—when she gives
the respect morally owed to other standard adult human beings; being
disappointed in and, when appropriate, punishing her—perhaps even
with death a` la capital punishment—when she fails to give the moral re-
spect owed to other standard adult human beings; entering into special
moral contracts with her a` la professional duties; reasoning with her over
moral matters; developing morality-guided public policies with her; and
much more. Since treating the standard human infant in any of these
ways would be extremely misguided if not altogether perverse, this dif-
ference in treatment can be reasonably characterized as radical in nature.
Indeed, a plausible analysis of “radically different treatment” presents
itself: if treating standard human infants and standard adult human be-
ings in a way is such that said treatment would be extremely misguided if
not perverse for the former but not for the latter, then to treat standard
adult human beings in accordance with said treatment while refraining
from treating standard human infants in accordance with said treatment
constitutes radically different treatment. If this is, in fact, true—as it
seems to be—then we sometimes justifiably treat standard human in-
fants and standard adult human beings in radically different ways, and
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we do so, ultimately, given the quantitative differences in their respective
capacities for rational moral agency. Quantitative differences in property
possession can, it appears, justify treating entities in radically different
ways.
George and Tollefsen would counter, no doubt, that—despite what I
contend above—the preceding does not involve treating entities in rad-
ically different ways. Specifically, they would argue that the proper
meaning of treating entities in “radically different ways” is to be derived
from the first sentence of the first blocked quotation, namely, that the
“difference between a being that deserves full moral respect and a being
that does not (and can therefore legitimately be disposed of as a means
of benefiting others) cannot consist only in the fact that, while both have
some feature, one has more of it than the other.” On this narrower un-
derstanding, to treat entities in radically different ways is to deem some
of them as deserving of full moral respect and treat them accordingly
(e.g., by respecting their right to life) and to deem others of them as
not deserving of full moral respect and treat them accordingly (e.g., by
using them as a mere means to the ends of others). Given this meaning
of treating entities in “radically different ways,” their claim here would
be that no mere quantitative difference in property possession between
two entities can justify treating one of them in the former way and the
other in the latter way.
But is this true? In order to determine whether it is, it’s important to
state explicitly something that thus far has been merely implied: that the
property in question makes no difference. Stated explicitly, their claim is
that no mere quantitative difference in property possession between two
entities can justify treating them in radically different ways no matter
what the property is. Now, it is rather clear that no mere quantitative
difference in property possession between two entities can justify treating
them in radically different ways when it comes to some properties. The
analogy above involving the racist is a case in point: that there is a
quantitative difference in shade of skin between two human beings is no
justification for deeming one of them as deserving of full moral respect
and treating them accordingly and deeming the other as not deserving
of full moral respect and treating them accordingly. After all—and as
has been argued forcefully by other philosophers—the shade of one’s
skin (whatever it might be) is not a moral-standing-conferring property,
much less a full-moral-respect-conferring property.27
What’s not so clear is that no mere quantitative difference in property
possession between two entities can justify treating them in radically dif-
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ferent ways when it comes to every property (read, of course, as: every
property that admits of degrees). Too see this, let us revisit the prop-
erty with which we began our discussion of the quantitative-differences
error: the capacity for rational moral agency. As I argued above, that
the standard adult human being possesses the ultimate capacity for ra-
tional moral agency while the standard human infant possesses merely
the basic capacity for rational moral agency justifies treating them in
radically different ways. Granted, I was employing a meaning of “rad-
ically different ways” that might be broader than what SV defenders
intended. But employing the narrower meaning of “radically different
ways” can generate this conclusion as well: that the standard adult
human being possesses the ultimate capacity for rational moral agency
while the standard human infant possesses merely the basic capacity for
rational moral agency justifies deeming the former as deserving of full
moral respect and treating her accordingly and deeming the latter as not
deserving of full moral respect and treating him accordingly. For, unlike
shade of skin, the capacity for rational moral agency is a moral-standing-
conferring property, or so SV defenders and most other theorists would
agree. Even more importantly, the ultimate capacity for rational moral
agency arguably confers greater—indeed, much greater—moral standing
on entities that possess it than does the mere basic capacity for ratio-
nal moral agency. After all, entities that possess the former are entities
whose capacity to make, and act on the basis of, moral judgments is
immediately exercisable and, thus, are actually able to make, and act
on the basis of, moral judgments. Whereas entities that possess the lat-
ter are entities whose capacity to make, and act on the basis of, moral
judgments is not even remotely exercisable—let alone immediately so—
and, thus, are only potentially able to make, and act on the basis of,
moral judgments. And it’s very hard to believe that possession of the
mere potential for the actual ability to make, and act on the basis of,
moral judgments would be very morally valuable, let alone so morally
valuable as to give entities possessing it dignity-conferring intrinsic value
and full moral standing. To motivate this, suppose that, henceforth, all
human infants will be born with an environmentally induced disease that
prevents them from ever possessing the actual ability to make, and act
on the basis of, moral judgments. Such infants would retain the poten-
tial for making, and acting on the basis of, moral judgments, arguably,
since intrinsic to these infants would remain the plans for the proximate
and ultimate capacity for rational moral agency, albeit plans that will
never be realized due to the disease.28 And yet, it’s really difficult to
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believe that their possession of the mere potential for the actual abil-
ity to make, and act on the basis of, moral judgments would be very
morally valuable, let alone so morally valuable as to give such infants
dignity-conferring intrinsic value and full moral standing. This is not
to suggest that the mere potential for the actual ability to make, and
act on the basis of, moral judgments is utterly lacking in moral value.
But it is to suggest that, whatever its moral value, it is inferior—and
significantly so, ostensibly—to the value of the actual ability to make,
and act on the basis of, moral judgments—an ability that is considered
so valuable by SV defenders and most other theorists that they deem
possession of it to be sufficient for dignity-conferring intrinsic value and
full moral standing. With that in mind, one could argue that all entities
possessing the ultimate capacity for rational moral agency deserve full
moral respect, but entities possessing the mere basic capacity for ratio-
nal moral agency do not—though, of course, they might deserve some
level of moral respect.
Naturally, SV defenders will disagree. But identifying the funda-
mental grounds on which they will do so bears much dialectical fruit.
For the sake of space, I’ll cut to the chase: they will do so, ultimately,
on intuitive grounds. That the standard human infant does not deserve
full moral respect is deemed strongly counterintuitive by SV defenders—
indeed, so strongly counterintuitive that, as discussed during my initial
presentation of SV, they simply take it for granted that the standard
human infant deserves full moral respect. Whether they should simply
take this for granted is paper-length issue unto itself, so I will limit my-
self to the following. Retaining, by way of SV, the intuition that the
standard human infant deserves full moral respect requires SV defenders
to adopt views that, I have argued, are counterintuitive if not absurd,
such as (4)—again, that it is just as prima facie seriously wrong to let a
standard human fetus die as it is to let a standard adult human being die.
Accordingly, even if we all agreed with SV defenders that the standard
human infant deserves full moral respect, we would not thereby com-
mit ourselves to agreeing that we ought to retain that intuition through
SV. After all, some of SV’s intratheoretical propositions are strongly
counterintuitive as well—so strongly counterintuitive, in fact, that, as
SV defenders do with the developmental view, some philosophers (in-
cluding this one) reject SV on the basis of them. Indeed, even if we all
agreed that SV accounts for the intrinsic value and full moral standing
of (a)–(d) better than all of the theories of which we are aware, we would
not thereby commit ourselves to agreeing that we ought to embrace SV,
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counterintuitive intratheoretical propositions and all. That a theory ac-
counts for the intrinsic value and full moral standing of (a)–(d) better
than all of the theories of which we are aware does not entail—or, for
that matter, even suggest—that an even better theory is not waiting in
the wings, as it were. And given SV’s intrinsic implausibility, we’re bet-
ter off looking for such a theory rather than biting SV’s counterintuitive
bullets—or so it seems to me at any rate.
With the preceding in mind, and coming full circle, if SV defenders
defend against the quantitative-differences error by way of their intuition
regarding the standard human infant’s moral standing—and, with that
intuition, SV—they avoid one possible counterintuition (that the stan-
dard human infant does not deserve full moral respect) only to acquire
another (that it is just as prima facie seriously wrong to let a standard
human fetus die as it is to let a standard adult human being die). To
be sure, they might not find the latter counterintuitive—at least, they
might not find it to be as counterintuitive as the former. But I and others
do—strongly so, in fact—which is enough for us to deem SV intrinsically
implausible. What’s more, SV defenders would (or, at least, should, on
pain of inconsistency) agree that our finding it so is enough for us to
deem SV intrinsically implausible. For they also reject rival theories in
one fell counterintuitive swoop. They reject the developmental view in
this way, for instance, maintaining that it cannot accommodate their
intuition that the standard human infant deserves full moral respect.
Before bringing this discussion of the quantitative-differences error
to a close, a final dialectical complication is worth noting. There is
some evidence that, contrary to what was suggested above, George and
Tollefsen themselves find (4) counterintuitive. To see this, let us revisit
the case they introduced—that of Jones and his opportunity to save ei-
ther one five-year-old girl or ten frozen human embryos from a burning
building. As addressed while discussing the extratheoretical-proposition
error, George and Tollefsen offer what they deem to be a SV-consistent
way of choosing to save the girl rather than the embryos, a way to which
I have raised objections. But the problems with George and Tollefsen’s
take on this case do not stop there, as is evident once one attempts
to answer the following questions: If George and Tollefsen don’t find
(4) counterintuitive—as they would claim, presumably—why did they
characterize Jones’ decision as that of saving either one five-year-old girl
or ten human embryos? Why didn’t they characterize Jones’ decision
as that of saving either one five-year-old girl or one human embryo?
After all, according to their theory of choice—SV—the human embryo
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possesses the intrinsic value and moral standing that the five-year-old
girl possesses, so why stack the embryonic and, in turn, argumentative
deck, so to speak? There might have been numerous reasons for do-
ing so, of course. But I would be quite surprised if the following was
not one of them: that characterizing Jones’ decision as that of saving
either one five-year-old girl or one human embryo fails to generate SV-
favorable intuitions—specifically, it generates instead the intuition that
Jones should save the five-year-old girl. If this is in fact one of their
reasons, then it serves as some evidence that—despite any claims to
the contrary—George and Tollefsen find (4) counterintuitive, at least to
some degree.
To motivate the preceding further, let us modify the Jones case.
Suppose that Jones’ decision was that of saving either one five-year-old
girl or—not ten human embryos—but ten five-year -old girls. I am quite
certain that most people, including George and Tollefsen, would hold
that Jones ought to save the ten five-year-old girls rather than just the
one five-year-old girl, For each five-year-old girl is intrinsically valuable
and possesses full moral standing and, everything else being equal, saving
ten intrinsically valuable entities possessing full moral standing is better
than saving only one intrinsically valuable entity possessing full moral
standing.
But if human embryos have the same intrinsic value and moral stand-
ing as five-year-old girls, then one would think that George and Tollefsen
would have argued that, just as Jones ought to save the ten five-year-old
girls rather than just the one five-year-old girl in the modified case, so
Jones ought to save the ten human embryos rather than just the one
five-year-old girl in the original case. Alas, they do not argue so. In-
stead, rather than addressing the issue of what Jones ought to do, they
take (as alluded to above) a far less ambitious path and address what
Jones might do. After George and Tollefsen present the SV-consistent
way of choosing to save the girl rather than the embryos, they then at-
tempt to bolster SV by offering what they deem to be SV-consistent
ways of choosing to save the embryos and concluding that there could
be circumstances in which “people could agree . . . ” (not: will likely
agree) “that it would be reasonable for a particular person to save the
embryos” (not: that it would be right for a particular person to save
the embryos), that “Jones might well choose to rescue them” (not: that
Jones ought to choose to rescue them), and that the choice to save the
embryos “is not necessarily fanciful or unreasonable” (not: is the right
thing to do).29 One cannot help but wonder why George and Tollefsen
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took such a guarded path. After all, the language they employ would
be considered excessively cautious, if not timorous, in the modified case
(just imagine someone saying that the choice to save the ten five-year-old
girls rather than just the one five-year-old girl “is not necessarily fanciful
or unreasonable”). And if human embryos have the same intrinsic value
and moral standing as five-year-old girls, then such language should be
considered excessively cautious if not timorous in the original case as
well. So, again, whence the less ambitious path? I cannot help but
think that, claims to the contrary notwithstanding, George and Tollef-
sen doubt, intuitively, that human embryos really do possess the same
intrinsic value and moral standing as five-year-old girls. (Either that or
they doubt that their readers will find it intuitive that human embryos
possess the same intrinsic value and moral standing as five-year-old girls.
But this would present a problem for George and Tollefsen as well. For
if their readers will not find it intuitive that human embryos possess the
same intrinsic value and moral standing as five-year-old girls, then they
might reject SV on those grounds alone.)
5 The Non-Normative-Answer Error
This brings us to the third and final error, the description of which is
more straightforward than those of the first two. In short, when con-
fronted with a potentially SV-undermining normative question, some SV
defenders provide a non-normative answer rather than what is, in fact,
the relevant type of answer: a normative one. More specifically, given
that, according to SV, it is just as prima facie seriously wrong to kill (e)
as it is to kill (a)—the standard human fetus and the standard adult hu-
man being, respectively—a normative question naturally arises: What,
given SV, should be the legal punishment (if any) for intentionally killing
(e) through an abortion? In another critique of SV, I argue that, when
SV’s intratheoretical propositions are conjoined with two extratheoret-
ical (and quite plausible) propositions—namely, “Morally similar cases
should be treated morally similarly” and “The legal penalty for inten-
tionally killing (a)–(d) should be severe (i.e., lengthy incarceration, at
the very least)”—one may deduce that the legal punishment for inten-
tionally killing (e) through an abortion should be as severe as the legal
punishment for intentionally killing (a)–(d). Whether or not SV defend-
ers agree with this, however, is unclear. For rather than providing a
normative answer to this normative question, various SV defenders pro-
vide a non-normative answer instead, the gist of which is that the legal
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punishment for intentionally killing (e) through an abortion would not
be as severe as the legal punishment for intentionally killing entities (a)–
(d). But such an answer is neither here nor there, since the question at
hand is what should the legal punishment be, given SV, not what would
it be. Even if their non-normative answer happens to be correct, then,
it skirts—and thereby fails to address—the issue.
Here’s an example. In his Defending Life: A Moral and Legal Case
Against Abortion, Beckwith addresses the question of what the legal
punishment for intentionally killing (e) through an abortion should be,
given SV. He contends that, even given SV, physicians who performed
abortions and women who procured them would not be punished as
severely as those who intentionally killed entities (a)–(d) or procured
such killings. For, when making judgments of sentencing, legislatures
would have to take into consideration various “facts” (I employ scare
quotes merely to express my uncertainty as to whether they are indeed
facts), including:
• Unborn human beings are full-fledged members of the human com-
munity and to kill them with no justification is unjustified homi-
cide.
• Because of a general lack of understanding of the true nature of
the unborn child . . . most citizens who procure abortions will do
so out of well-meaning ignorance.
• Women who seek illegal abortions will probably do so out of des-
peration.
• [T]he illegal abortionist will not be ignorant of the demands and
purposes of the law and the nature of the being that the abortion
kills. However, because juries may be reluctant to sentence such a
physician to decades in prison let alone the death penalty, a lighter
penalty may be easier to secure.
• The government has an interest in preventing unjustified and pre-
meditated killing of human beings, whether born or unborn, who
live within its jurisdiction.30
And there is “no doubt,” Beckwith writes, “that the law will reflect these
sentiments if abortion is made illegal again.”31
Now, notice, if you will, that Beckwith’s reply involves providing a
non-normative answer to what is, as indicated above, a normative ques-
tion. To the question, “What, given SV, should be the legal punishment
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for intentionally killing (e) through an abortion?,” Beckwith effectively
responds, “It would not be equal in severity to the legal punishment for
intentionally killing (a)–(d).” But this answer is, at bottom, irrelevant.
For the question at hand is what should the legal punishment be, given
SV, not what would it be. Even granting that the law will reflect the
aforementioned sentiments and, in turn, that physicians who performed
abortions and women who procured them would not be punished as
severely as those who intentionally killed entities (a)–(d) or procured
such killings, Beckwith’s reply is ultimately irrelevant.32
Here’s another example, this time involving Friberg-Fernros. Friberg-
Fernros contends that those who intentionally kill (e) through an abor-
tion should be punished severely. However, he does not judge this to
be counterintuitive much less absurd. His reasoning behind this is as
follows:
[I]t is important to note that the classification of abortion
as a murder does not clearly imply a specific punishment; it
can vary between a few years in prison to a life sentence or
capital punishment. If abortion was considered as a murder, I
think it would be most like infanticide rather than any other
kind of homicide. I think it is reasonable to assume that
proponents of the substance view might consider the fetus in
the same way that most societies consider infants. And the
punishment for infanticide is generally much lower than the
punishment for other kinds of murder. In many countries the
maximum penalty is five years [sic] imprisonment.33
Like Beckwith’s, Friberg-Fernros’s reply involves providing a non-
normative answer to what is, as indicated above, a normative question.
To the question, “What, given SV, should be the legal punishment for
intentionally killing (e) through an abortion?,” Friberg-Fernros effec-
tively responds, “It would be equal in severity to the legal punishment
for intentionally killing (d), but not (a)–(c).” And, as with Beckwith’s,
Friberg-Fernros’s answer is ultimately irrelevant. For, again, the ques-
tion at hand is what should the legal punishment be, given SV, not what
would it be. Even if his non-normative answer regarding what would be
the case happens to be correct, then, Friberg-Fernros fails to address the
issue.
To be sure, one might argue that both Beckwith and Friberg-Fernros
could grant my critique and respond to it by changing their non-
normative answers to normative answers—in other words, by changing
their “would” claims to “should” claims.34 So, rather than claiming
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that the legal punishment for intentionally killing (e) through an abor-
tion would not be as severe as the legal punishment for intentionally
killing entities (a)–(d) (or, in Friberg’s case, just (a)–( c)), they could
claim that the legal punishment for intentionally killing (e) through an
abortion should not be as severe as the legal punishment for intention-
ally killing entities (a) – (d). But doing so would produce problems of its
own. To begin with, in what, exactly, would their new “should” claims
be grounded? They wouldn’t—indeed couldn’t, on pain of giving up
SV—be grounded in the claim that (e) has weaker moral standing than
(a)–(d), since, according to SV, (e) has full moral standing just as (a)–(d)
do. They also couldn’t be grounded in extratheoretical propositions—
such as “It is not as wrong to kill entities that have weak time-relative
interests in continued existence (such as conscious human fetuses) as
it is to kill entities that have strong time-relative interests in contin-
ued existence (such as standard adult human beings)”—since this would
involve committing the extratheoretical-proposition error. (Similar to
claims I made while discussing that error, the issue here is what, given
SV, should be the legal punishment for intentionally killing (e) through
an abortion.)
Perhaps their new “should” claims would be grounded in the rejec-
tion of one or both of the aforementioned extratheoretical propositions
(“Morally similar cases should be treated morally similarly” and “The
legal penalty for intentionally killing (a)–(d) should be severe”). But
this would be misguided—or so it seems to me—since, as stated above,
each of these extratheoretical propositions is quite plausible; indeed, by
my lights, much more plausible than SV’s fundamental propositions.
Perhaps instead—and, given Beckwith’s and Friberg-Fernros’s respec-
tive defenses of their “would” claims, most obviously—they would be
grounded in a socio-political claim of one sort or another, such as those
made by Beckwith containing the aforementioned “facts” and those made
by Friberg-Fernros regarding the punishment for infanticide and how it
is lower than the punishment for other kinds of killing. But there are
problems here as well.
In Beckwith’s case, grounding this new “should” claim in his socio-
political claims containing the previous “facts” would not successfully
defend against my contention that, given SV plus the two aforemen-
tioned extratheoretical propositions, the legal punishment for intention-
ally killing (e) through an abortion should be as severe as the legal
punishment for intentionally killing (a)–(d). To see this, consider con-
tract killings. Some women (for example) have hired contract killers
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to kill their spouses. Clearly, their spouses are “full-fledged members
of the human community and to kill them with no justification is un-
justified homicide.” Just as clearly, the “government has an interest in
preventing unjustified and premeditated” contract killings within its ju-
risdiction. Furthermore, it’s safe to assume that many of the women
who do this probably “do so out of desperation.” It’s also safe to assume
that the contract killer “will not be ignorant of the demands and pur-
poses of the law and the nature of the being” that he kills. Even so, the
law dictates that contract killings are instances of murder and that both
the killer and the one who hired the killer should be punished severely.
If Beckwith does not think that induced abortions should be treated
similarly to contract killings, he should provide a reason for thinking
so—something that, as far as I can tell, he has not done.
One significant disananlogy, of course, pertains to the second listed
“fact”: there isn’t a general lack of understanding of the true nature
of spouses and, thus, most people who procure contract killings will
not do so out of well-meaning ignorance. But one reason there isn’t
a general lack of understanding of the true nature of spouses—more
to the point, of standard adult human beings—is that the punishment
for murdering them is as severe as it is. Among other purposes, the law
serves that of educating people—quickly and effectively, I might add—on
the true nature of standard adult human beings (at least, on what society
deems the true nature of standard adult human beings). Given just this,
let alone his SV-supported judgment that abortion is a “great moral
evil,” Beckwith has reason to agree with me that, given SV, the legal
punishment for intentionally killing (e) through an abortion should be as
severe as the legal punishment for intentionally killing (a)–(d).35 Indeed,
to advocate for a weaker punishment would not merely sustain but likely
reinforce a view that Beckwith deems gravely erroneous, namely, that
standard human fetuses do not possess intrinsic value and moral standing
equal to that of (a)–(d).
Second, and related to the previous reply, given SV-guided changes
in law, public policy, education (and the like) in conjunction with the
passage of time, the general lack of understanding of the “true” nature
of fetuses would eventually dissipate, as is evidenced by—among other
things—the histories of previously marginalized peoples. And with the
dissipation of the general lack of understanding of the “true” nature of
fetuses would go the aforementioned disanalogy.
In Friberg-Fernros’s case, grounding this new “should” claim in the
socio-political claims regarding the punishment for infanticide and how
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it is lower than the punishment for other kinds of killing would also
fail to defend against my argument here. For such claims just push
the problem back, raising the question: What, given SV, should be the
legal punishment for intentionally killing (d)? And similar to before,
one could argue that, by conjoining SV’s intratheoretical propositions
with the aforementioned extratheoretical propositions, one may deduce
that the legal punishment for intentionally killing (d) should be as severe
as the legal punishment for intentionally killing (a)–(c). And whatever
that might be, five years’ imprisonment does not seem to be nearly severe
enough, given SV.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, I identified three significant errors committed by various
philosophers in their defense of the theory of intrinsic value and moral
standing known as the “substance view,” namely:
• the extratheoretical-proposition error: that of invoking extratheo-
retical propositions in an attempt to defend the substance view’s
intratheoretical propositions and, with them, intrinsic plausibility,
• the quantitative-differences error: that of overlooking that quanti-
tative differences in property possession can give rise to qualitative
differences in property possession which, in turn, can justify treat-
ing entities in radically different ways, and
• the non-normative-answer error: that of providing a non-normative
answer to a potentially substance-view-undermining normative
question.
It may be that the substance view can be defended without committing
these errors. But whether this is so remains to be seen.36
Notes
1 As SV defenders Robert P. George and Christopher Tollefsen write, “we must dis-
tinguish two senses of the capacity (or, as it is sometimes called, the potentiality)
for mental functions, psychological states, and so on” [3, 80].
2 See[6, 264ff].
3 [1, 139].
4 For more on this understanding of intrinsic value, see [12, chapters 1 and 3].
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5 [13, 3].
6 For more on full moral standing, see [13, 4ff] and [5, 509-30].
7 [3, 105].
8 [3, 109].
9 As Patrick Lee and Robert P. George write, “While membership in the species
Homo sapiens is sufficient for full moral worth, it is not in any direct sense the
criterion for moral worth. If we discovered extraterrestrial beings of a rational
nature, or that some other terrestrial species did have a rational nature, then
we would owe such beings full respect. Still, all members of the human species
do have full moral worth because all of them do have a rational nature and are
moral agents . . . ”[4, 82].
10 [3, 117ff]; [4, 253ff].
11 To motivate their position, consider just two other possible theories of (a)–(d)’s
intrinsic value and full moral standing: one according to which possessing the
accidental property of the proximate capacity for rational moral agency is re-
quired for intrinsic value and full moral standing, the other according to which
possessing the accidental property of the ultimate capacity for rational moral
agency is required for intrinsic value and full moral standing. Given either of
these theories, one or more of (a)–(d)—such as (d)—lacks intrinsic value and
full moral standing. These two theories fail, then, to account for the intrinsic
value and full moral standing of (a)–(d). And so it is, SV defenders maintain,
with every theory save for SV. Only SV, they argue, succeeds in accounting for
the intrinsic value and full moral standing of (a)–(d), since (a)–(d) possess the
essential property of the basic capacity for rational moral agency.
12 [1, xii].
13 To be sure, the language of “intratheoretical” propositions might be new. But
assessing theories in this way is not.
14 That this is a nonmoral claim may be demonstrated by analyzing “future like
ours.” Beginning with “future,” by it Marquis means the life one will live if one
lives out one’s natural life span. And by future “like ours,” Marquis means a
future constituted by personal goods of consciousness, goods that one will (or
would) value when one will (or would) experience them. To claim that someone
has a future like ours, then, is to claim that the life she will live if she lives out
her natural life span is constituted by personal goods of consciousness. And this
is a nonaxiological/nonmoral claim. (Were the claim changed to “It is good that
the life she will live if she lives out her natural life span is constituted by personal
goods of consciousness,” it would become an axiological/moral claim.)
15 This objection was anticipated and briefly addressed by Marquis himself, and
more fully developed and pressed by Alastair Norcross. See [8, 183-202] and [9,
268-77].
16 [13, 3ff].
17 See [3, 119].
18 [11, chapter 10].
19 More explicitly, from (1), (2), (3), and the nonaxiological/nonmoral proposition
(“Both the standard human fetus and the standard adult human being possess
the essential property of the basic capacity for rational moral agency”), one may
deduce that is it prima facie seriously wrong to let a standard human fetus die
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as well as to let a standard adult human being die. Since the serious wrongness
of letting each of these entities die supervenes on their moral standing, and since
both possess full moral standing, one may deduce it is just as prima facie seriously
wrong to let a standard human fetus die as it is to let a standard adult human
being die.
20 [6, 269ff].
21 [2, 211-16].
22 [6, 269ff].
23 [3, 140].
24 To motivate further the inadequacy of the preceding defense, consider the fol-
lowing addition to Jones’s case: the five-year-old girl is deeply, but reversibly,
comatose and, thus, will not suffer. This addition precludes invoking a suffering-
based extratheoretical proposition like the preceding in SV’s defense and lays bare
what I and others take to be SV’s counterintuitive if not absurd intratheoretical
propositions.
25 Ibid., 120.
26 Ibid., 120-21.
27 See [12] as well as [10, chapter 1].
28 See [7, 380-82] for a more developed argument for the claim that such infants
would retain the potential for making, and acting on the basis of, moral judg-
ments.
29 [3, 140].
30 [1, 110].
31 Ibid., 110.
32 It’s worth noting that, in the process of committing this error, Beckwith commits
another one as well, that of invoking extratheoretical propositions in defense of
SV’s intratheoretical propositions. See [1, 110].
33 Ibid. 216.
34 I owe this point to an anonymous referee.
35 [1, 108].
36 I would like to thank two anonymous referees for their comments on earlier drafts
of this paper.
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